Abstract Autonomous agents developed by experts are embedded with the capability to interact well with people from different cultures. When designing expert agents intended to interact with autonomous agents developed by non-game theory agents (NGTE), it is beneficial to obtain insights on the behavior of these NGTE agents. Is the behavior of these NGTE agents similar to human behavior from different cultures? This is an important question as such a quality would allow an expert agent interacting with NGTE agents to model them using the same methods that are used to model humans from different cultures. To study this point, we evaluated NGTE agents behavior using a game called the Trust-Revenge game, which is known in social science for capturing different human tendencies. The Trust-Revenge game has a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium strategy profile, however, very rarely do people follow it. We compared the behavior of autonomous agents to the actions of several human demographic groups-one of which is similar to the designers of the autonomous agents. We claim that autonomous agents are similar to human players from various cultures. This enables the use of approaches, developed for handling cultural diversity among humans, to be applied for interaction with NGTE agents. This paper also analyzes additional aspects of autonomous agents behavior and whether composing autonomous agents affects human behavior.
Introduction
Autonomous agents are integrated into numerous environments, such as electronic commerce, web crawlers, military agents, space exploration probes, autonomous drivers, disabled assistance and social interaction [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] . Autonomous agents designed by game theory experts often implement a fully rational strategy. However, the rise in computer science education along with the availability of software development tools has increased the number of autonomous agents developed by non-game theory experts (NGTE) and amateurs. As a result, when designing autonomous agents one must consider that they will also interact with the NGTE agents.
Modeling agents is beneficial for agent-agent interaction [6] . However, building an exact model is often infeasible. There are many studies on agents that interact with fully rational agents [7] or humans [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] . However one cannot assume that the NGTE autonomous agents are rational [19] , or that they exhibit the same behavior as the population that designed them [20, 21] . This raises a challenge for an agent interacting with NGTE agents.
Recent autonomous agents developed by experts are embedded with the capability to interact well with different cultures [22, 23] . These agents were built to explicit reason about and react to the specific cultures they considered in several ways. Our work particularly follows Haim et al.'s negotiation agent that considers different cultures. Their PAL agent contains a meta-framework that uses a combination of machine learning and decision theory to tune parameters that fit each culture [23] . Specifically, they posit that general social factors regarding generosity and reliability exist across all cultures, but to varying degrees. The goal of the agent is then to learn the exact levels of these social factors in a given culture so that a more effective negotiation agent can be built.
The main focus of this study is to determine whether the behavior of NGTE agents is similar to human behavior from different cultures. We posit that although NGTE agents use different strategies than people these differences can be effectively modeled as differences between cultures. Once one realizes that NGTE agents can be modeled as a distinct culture, then methods developed for interacting with distinct cultures (such as [22, 23] ) can be applied to better interact with NGTE agents. This is a non-trivial result, since if NGTE agents were to behave very differently of humans (e.g. if they were nearly fully rational), then using methods developed for interaction with multiple cultures would likely fail, since such methods usually rely on human properties known from social science [24] . We use the term culture loosely, to refer to demographic groups, as is common in the literature.
In order to experimentally confirm our hypothesis that the behavior of autonomous agents falls within cultural diversities we use the Trust-Revenge game. This game is an extension of the investment game introduced by Berg [25] . The investment game was developed in order to study investment and reciprocity in an economic setting, and has generated much interest since its inception [26] . This game was later enhanced with an extra stage where the player can choose to take revenge [27] .
In this paper we analyze the behavior of NGTE autonomous agents and compare it to the behavior of groups of humans from three different cultures. We introduce a quantitative measure, and use it to show that in the trust-revenge game the autonomous agents average action is similar to the human cultures. We therefore determine that NGTE autonomous agents can be described as a separate human culture and conclude that modeling NGTE autonomous agents the same way human cultural variations are modeled, is likely to be a generally useful approach. The findings of this research have practical implications for designing agents that interact with autonomous agents designed by NGTE. An additional contribution of this study is, that we determine whether the programming of autonomous agents has an impact on the composers in our game.
Related work
This paper's significant contribution lies in its empirical finding that NGTE agents can be modeled as a distinct culture within a general trust-revenge game involving an opponent. Opponent modeling is of great importance when designing autonomous agents which interact with other agents [6] . Carmel and Markovitch [28] showed that if an agent can build a model of its opposing agent, this model could be used to improve its own performance. McCracken and Bowling [29] proposed a method for modeling an opponent in the Rock-Paper-Scissors domain. Lazaric et al. [30] proposed a method for opponent modeling in Kuhn Poker (a degenerated version of poker). However, in more sophisticated games these methods become intractable.
Another field which raised significant interest is whether people develop agents similar to their own behavior [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] . While we will survey some of these works below, the overall trend within these works is that while there are some similarities between the agents developed and their developers' behavior, they are not identical [20, 21, 35] . In this paper, we study whether these differences are within the differences observed among different cultures. Grosz et al. [21] introduced the Colored Trails game specifically in order to investigate decision-making strategies in multi-agent situations. They showed that human players and agents do not play in the same way. Their results indicate that people design autonomous agents that don't play as well as human players, possibly because they cooperate less than people. It is interesting to note that the agents also do not adhere to the equilibrium strategy. Unlike Grosz et al. [21] who studied a mixed human-agent environment, since this paper studies understanding agent behavior, we required that agents play with agents and humans play with humans. Manisterski et al. [36] explored the evolution of autonomous agents in a negotiation environment. Designers were given a chance to improve the agents based on previous performance. Their findings showed that autonomous agents seem to perform better than equilibrium agents but not as well as Pareto-optimal agents. However, they did not compare the behavior of agents to that of humans. Rosenfeld and Kraus [19] demonstrated that autonomous agents for search domains use key elements of bounded rationality known from behavioral economics (such as the Aspiration Adaptation Theory). This work may be an important indication to our initial questioning. However, unfortunately, they did not compare the behavior of agents to that of humans either. Chalamish et al. [37] tested the similarity between human strategies and those of autonomous agents. They concluded that human behavior is often similar to that of their own autonomous agent. Unfortunately, in their study, the human player subjects were also the composers of the autonomous agents and were requested to play many games before they composed their agents. Therefore, when composing the agents, the subjects may have been heavily influenced by how they played the game earlier. Work by Lin et al. [35] evaluated if NGTE agents-which they term peer designed agents (PDA) could be used instead of people to evaluate expert negotiation agents. They found that while significant differences did exist between PDAs and people's behaviors, PDAs did provide strong indications about how the people would behave. Nonetheless, their work did not attempt to quantify when these similarities and differences exist as our work does. Note that PDA's are usually used to simulate the behavior of humans. In our paper we use the term NGTE agents, rather than PDA's, to emphasize that we study interaction with autonomous agents developed by NGTE in general (as is becoming widespread), not specifically PDA's which are used for simulations.
Many previous studies have examined how culture affects players' behavior. Examples include studies designed to compare cultures [38, 39] and meta-studies [26, 40, 41] . Hofstede [42] studied the causes of differences between cultures, while we are interested in observing these differences and not in explaining them. Willinger et al. [38] compared French and German players of the investment game, and showed that German players invested more than French players, while reciprocity does not differ between the two groups. Johnson and Mislin [26] performed a meta-analysis of the investment game by collecting studies conducted in various settings with different cultures and comparing the results. They found that demographic groups do indeed play differently, and less was spent in investment games played in Africa than in North America. As these studies show, there are differences between different cultures or demographic groups. This motivates us to study whether autonomous agents display behavior that falls within the diversity of human cultures.
Studies on expert agents that interact with different human cultures provide motivation to our study. Haim et al. [23] rely on measures adapted from psychology [43] to build their PAL agent using machine learning. Gal et al. [22] also build an expert agent that is designed to interact with different cultures. This agent although being adaptive is Rule Based. Our results imply, that these agents should be able to interact well with NGTE agents as well.
Interaction with different cultures has raised interest in the domain of virtual agents as well [44, 45] . Mascarenhas et al. [44] propose a model that allows agents to adapt their relational behavior to different cultures. They propose a model where agents can be given different social interaction dynamics, that represent different cultures. These agents can be used to train humans on interaction with different cultures. Kistler et al. [45] explain that humans from different cultures practice varying non-verbal behavior. They introduce a virtual agent that can display culture-specific behaviors, enabling a comfortable interaction between the agent and people. However, our results may have milder impact on agents using virtual human characters since NGTE agents are less likely than humans to be influenced by the behavior of a virtual human character.
In this paper we also test whether the simple act of composing agents has any impact on the behavior of the composers. This exact question was raised by Elmalech et al. [46] . They studied the 'door game', which is a single player game developed by Shin and Ariely [47] . In this game, a player is faced with three doors, each associated with a different distribution of payoffs. The distribution of each door is a priori unknown to the player. The player first chooses with which door to begin, and from that point on, any additional click on that door will yield a reward drawn from that distribution. At any time, the player may pay some cost and switch to any other door by clicking on it. In their work they showed that agent composition alters the behavior of the composers, i.e. that subjects which composed agents behaved differently than subjects which did not compose any agents. Our findings are described in Sect. 5.
Trust-revenge game
The Trust-Revenge Game, which will be described shortly, is a two player game designed to arouse three different behaviors. We term these behaviors-trust, reciprocation (fear) and revenge. Although trust and fear are not behaviors, we use these terms to describe behaviors (and actions) that might be performed as a result of trust or fear.
Research with human subjects on trust, reciprocation and revenge (or punishment) has been conducted in the past. The investment game was first introduced by Berg [25] . In the investment game there are two types of players. Each player is given 10 chips at the beginning of the game. Players of type A are told that they can give some or all of their chips to a player of type B (this is the trust stage). The number of chips that Player A decides to give is multiplied by 3. Then Player B can give back some or all of what he was given (the reciprocation stage). The subgame-perfect equilibrium for this game is for both types of players to send nothing. Berg conducted the experiment with students (human subjects). As expected, the human subjects did not act according to the subgame-perfect equilibrium, and chips were transferred by both types of players.
Gneezy and Ariely [27] used a variant of the investment game which included an additional revenge phase. In their experiment, each of the two players started off with $10. The first player had to decide whether he wanted to end the game or to pass the full amount to the second player. If he decided to pass his money, the second player received an additional $40 for a total of $50. Then the second player had to decide whether to keep all of the money or to give half of the money back to the first player. If the second player decided to keep all of the money for herself, the first player could decide to take revenge on her and pay any amount from his own private money (up to $25); this amount was multiplied by 2 and subtracted from the second player's revenue. The results of Gneezy and Ariely's experiment show that the first player often takes revenge on the second player (when the second player keeps all of the money).
We use a variant of the game used by Gneezy and Ariely: the Trust-Revenge Game. This game is composed of three stages: Trust, Reciprocate and Revenge. This game is a "one-shot" game, i.e. after the three stages are completed, the game terminates (there are no repeated interactions). There are two types of players (A and B) in the game. At the beginning of the game Players A and B are both given a certain number of chips. The first stage is the Trust stage, where Player A is able to give any portion of his chips to Player B. There is a factorthe Trust Rate (tr)-by which the number of chips is multiplied when they are passed from Player A to Player B. The second stage is Reciprocate: after the chips have been transferred to Player B, Player B can decide how many chips to transfer back to Player A. Player B can transfer any number of chips (which she acquires) to player A. The third and final stage is Revenge: Player A plays another round in which he may pay any number of chips he has to the operator. Note that the chips are not transferred to anyone, merely subtracted from Player A's stack. However, in this round, Player B must pay a factor-Revenge Rate (rr)-on the number of chips Player A chose for revenge. Again, the chips are not transferred to anyone but merely subtracted from Player B's stack. Both the Trust Rate and the Revenge Rate are common knowledge and are revealed to both players at the beginning of the game.
Consider the following example: Assume that the Trust Rate, tr, equals 4 and that the Revenge Rate, rr, equals 6. Assume that both players started with 10 chips. Suppose that Player A gives 5 chips to Player B in the Trust stage. After applying the Trust Rate, Player B will receive 20 chips (5 · tr). At the end of this stage Player A has 5 chips and Player B has 30. Suppose Player B decides to give 7 chips to Player A in the Reciprocate stage. At the end of this stage Player A has 12 chips (5 + 7) and Player B has 23 chips (30 − 7). Suppose Player A revenges 3 chips at the Revenge stage. At the end of this stage (which ends the game) Player A has 9 chips (12 − 3), and Player B has 5 chips (23 − 3 · rr). Since this is a "one-shot" game, after the game ends, Player A and Player B have no further interactions.
In this game there is a clear, unique subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) strategy. In the revenge stage, there is no rational reason for Player A to take revenge, therefore in the SPE there is no revenge. In the reciprocation stage there is no reason for Player B to reciprocate since she assumes that Player A is rational and that he will not take revenge, therefore in the SPE there is no reciprocation. As a result, in the trust stage there is no rational reason for Player A to trust Player B since he knows that she will not reciprocate. Consequently the SPE is not to take revenge, not to reciprocate and not to trust.
We did not expect human subjects to follow the SPE and we presumed they transfer chips in all three stages (in accordance with the literature [25] [26] [27] ). We also believed we would find differences in behavior between the different cultures. We examine the NGTE agents' behavior to see if it is similar enough to humans from various cultures to be considered within cultural diversity.
Experimental setup 4.1 Game settings
Throughout the experiments we used 5 different settings of the Trust-Revenge Game, shown in Table 1 . These settings were chosen meticulously to capture the following behaviors:
The Investment setting, is analogous to a simple classical trust (investment) game, with no revenge. In such a game, Player A cannot enforce or threaten Player B in any way, and any amount returned by Player B may be associated with reciprocation rather than fear of revenge. The Dictator setting is analogous to a dictator game, where one player starts with all the money and may contribute any amount to the second player. In this setting, Player A cannot attempt to gain anything from transferring chips over to Player B in the trust stage, since player B may only return in the reciprocate stage some (or all) the money received from Player B, but not more. Thus, any amount transferred in this setting may be attributed to generosity. The TR 1 setting is a classical Trust-Revenge setting, in which both the trust and the revenge rates are set to 3. The TR 2 setting doubles both the trust and the revenge rates; we expected this setting to increase average trust and revenge. The TR 3 setting gives Player A double chips and Player B no chips; we expected this setting to increase average trust even more.
Subjects
A set of 36 undergraduate computer science students from Israel composed NGTE agents for the Trust-Revenge Game (the Agents group). 6 agents were removed since they either did not compile or raised exceptions in run time, this resulted in a total of 30 agents. These developers were asked to provide detailed documentation explaining their design of the agent. This group of developers also played all the five settings of the Trust-Revenge game themselves (as humans) after they composed the agents. However, since developing an agent may have had impact on the way that these developers played the game themselves, we do not consider these games in the results section until we explicitly question whether developing an agent has impact on the developers behavior at the end of Sect. 5.
A different group of 35 undergraduate computer science students from Israel played the Trust-Revenge game with each other (these subjects did not compose agents). Two additional sets of players, one from the USA (50 subjects) and the other from India (46 subjects), played the game with each other (USA players played with other USA players and players from India played with other players from India). These players were recruited using Amazon's Mechanical Turk (AMT) [48] (these subjects did not compose agents either). Table 2 summarizes the different groups of subjects and provides some demographic details on each of the groups.
Number of games and motivation

Each autonomous agent (in the
games for all agents (we divide by 2 since every game requires two agents). Since the game is designed as a one-shot game, the agents were initialized every game and thus were unable to save information from game to game.
All human subjects (including the Israeli students who did not develop agents and the USA and India subjects) played 10 consecutive games. 1 To preserve the characteristic of a one-shot game, we ensured that the players were paired with different partners every game. The subjects were fully aware of this fact. All human subjects were required to pass a short quiz to ensure that they fully understood the game.
The two groups of students (those who composed agents and those who played as humans) were motivated by their grades to compose good agents and play well. In the group that composed agents, the students' grades depended on their agents' performance and its documentation. In the Israeli students who did not compose agents were motivated by their grades as well, since they were offered a bonus proportionate to their performance which was added to the grade of one of their assignments. The subjects in the USA and India groups which were recruited via AMT were motivated by a monetary payment which was proportionate to the final stake in each of the games.
The performance of all subjects and agents (used for granting the promised motivation) was measured according to its final result (relative to the number of chips) and did not depend on the opponent's performance or on the average performance. All subjects and agent designers were explicitly informed of this policy. The designers of the autonomous agents knew that their agents would play with other autonomous agents designed by their classmates. The students playing on the web knew that they were playing against a different student from their class, however they did not know against whom they were playing and we assured them that this information would remain confidential. The AMT subjects were also informed that they were playing with humans from their own culture. The human interface was fully web- 
Results
Recall that the main question of this paper is to determine whether the behavior of NGTE agents falls within cultural diversities. That is, whether the differences between NGTE agents and humans are quantitatively similar to the differences typically found between humans from different cultures. In order to answer this question we define the following quantitative measure: A group A, is considered to fall among the diversity of other groups B = {B 1 , B 2 , B 3 , . . .} if its average is between the average of the other groups minus their standard deviation, and the average of the other groups plus their standard deviation, i.e.
avg(A) ∈ avg(∪B) ± stdev({avg(B 1 ), avg(B 2 ), avg(B 3 ), . . .}).
Note that the standard deviation is calculated on the groups (B 1 , B 2 , B 3 , . . .) and not on the individuals inside these groups. 2 We will show that in the trust revenge game, the group of autonomous agents falls within the average action of the three human cultures plus or minus the standard deviation 2 We also considered a different criterion which tests whether the difference between the group A and ∪B are statistically significant. However, such a criterion would be sensible to the size of the data since, theoretically, any two groups which have different averages would differ statistically significantly if enough data is gathered. Futhermore, we do not claim that group A's distribution or average is similar to that of ∪B, but simply that it falls among the diversity of the groups in B. We therefore did not test this method on our data. among these three human cultures. Note, that assuming a normal distribution, only 68 % of the population is expected to fall within 1 standard deviation of the mean. Clearly, if a group is not part of the population, the profitability of it falling within this diversity would be low. Nevertheless, we show that the autonomous agents, fall within this range in all three game actions. We begin by presenting the average results for the strictly Trust-Revenge settings (TR 1, TR 2 and TR 3). As can be seen in the table, the agents fall within one standard deviation of the three human cultures confidence range is much smaller for the agents since they played many more games.) We conducted a Multivariant test with the trust, reciprocate and revenge amounts in each of the games played as the dependent variables and the culture and the settings as fixed variables. As expected, both culture and settings had significant impact on the behavior ( p < 0.0001), with F = 57.964 and F = 27.542 respectively. Also the two-way interaction between culture and settings (culture × settings) is statistically significant ( p < 0.0001) with F = 4.861. Tables 3, 4 and 5 show the Scheffe post hoc test p value results for each of the stages of the game. Results with p value smaller than 0.05 (which are considered statistically significant) are presented in bold font. Note that since the agents group included more games (and thus more data), differences reach statistical significance in many cases.
As we hypothesized, the activity of the agents falls within one standard deviation of the average of the three human cultures (see Table 6 for the exact details). This indicates that autonomous agents built by NGTE can indeed be treated within cultural diversities.
The percentage of players that gave away chips at each stage is shown in Fig. 4 . As depicted in Figs. 3 and 4 , subjects from all cultures along with the autonomous agents transferred (or paid) chips at all stages of the game. Although this does not comply with the subgame-perfect equilibrium, this result was expected in human behavior. Another interesting result is that the autonomous agents' activity is close to that of the activity shown by their own culture, but to a slightly lesser extent. Namely, the autonomous agents' behavior is slightly closer to that of the subgame-perfect equilibrium.
We found that using the SPE when playing with humans or autonomous agents does not yield the highest outcome. As illustrated in Fig. 3 , on average Player B reciprocated more than Player A trusted, with both humans and autonomous agents. No Player B ever reciprocated if Player A did not trust; therefore on average Player A gained from trusting (unlike the SPE which requires that there be no trust at all). It is fair to assume that the agent designers thought it might be beneficial to display trust as their agent might be rewarded by other agents during the reciprocation stage. Revenging, on the other hand, is clearly not an optimal behavior and thus an agent designed to take revenge may be attributed to its developer seeking for justice or fairness (in [27] it was shown that revenge is linked with enjoyment). The documentation collected from the students who designed the agents indicates that they understood that revenge would lower their final profit and that it was not beneficial in this single-shot game (74 % of the students explicitly stated this in their documentation). One of the players who sometimes took revenge, explicitly stated that: ". . .people must know that if they don't play fair they will get punished.", but also said that ". . .after all player B can't turn the clock back.". It was interesting to see that among students who chose not to take revenge some felt the need to justify this choice of not punishing their opponent, as one of them stated: "Take it easy. What was was.".
From the documentation we conclude that 38 % of the agents were explicitly designed to never take revenge, while 44 % of the agents decided whether to take revenge or not, based on the other player's stake (24 %) or reciprocation amount (20 %), and the remaining 18 % based their decision of whether to take revenge and its extent, solely on other variables, such as the game settings, their own stake, and random variables. We found that a common strategy with respect to the revenge stage, which was played by 17 % of the agents, was to take revenge if the other player had more chips than the agent, and if so to try and equalize the two players' stakes.
Although the fact that autonomous agents were designed to take revenge may be surprising to game theorists, it clearly shows that the actions of autonomous agents are similar to those of humans and can therefore be modeled using the same methods.
We proceeded by analyzing all the game settings (investment, dictator, TR 1, TR 2 and TR 3). Figure 5 presents the average chip transfer in the trust stage for each of the groups in each of the settings. As can be seen in the figure, in all but the investment setting, the agents blended in nicely with all the other groups. However, in the investment setting the agents displayed very little trust. Although this behavior is different than that demonstrated by the other groups, it turned out to be a better approach performance-wise, since on average the subjects in the same culture, Israel, lost on average 0.99 chips, or 63 % of their trust amount (the agents in the Agent group who did trust, received on average 27 % less than their trust amount). Interestingly, performance was not the major concern of the agents in the dictator settings, as they transferred more chips than their equivalent culture, when clearly little or no return could be expected. Figure 6 shows the percent of games in which the trust transfer was greater than 0. 
Percent of Games
Agents Israel USA India Fig. 6 Percent of games in which the trust transfer was greater than zero revenge rate (TR 1, TR 2 and TR 3), the players transferred (or paid) higher amounts in all three stages. It is also apparent that the players seemed to treat the dictator setting, similar to the dictator game, as the only major action was trust. Similarly, in the investment settings, only a negligible sum was actually revenged, showing that the players did treat this setting similarly to the investment game. In the investment or dictator settings, there was a revenge rate of 0. This means that if Player A decided to take revenge, chips were subtracted from Player A's stack. However since the revenge rate was 0, player B paid nothing, and thus only Player A was affected by revenge in these games and lost chips. Therefore, we refer to revenge in these two settings (which have a revenge rate of 0) as human error. The Agents took revenge in these two settings only 0.088 on average, which is only 22.6 % of the average revenge of the Israeli group in these settings (these differences are statistically significant with p < 0.05) and only 10.7 % of the total human revenge in these settings ( p < 0.001). This indicates that the agents tended to make less errors. Although we weren't generally interested in the performance of the autonomous agents or the humans, we compared the average final stacks obtained by the players at the end of the game (averaging throughout all five settings). In Fig. 8 , the SPE column shows theoretical game results between subgame perfect equilibrium agents. Since all subjects played both as Player A and as Player B the combined stack best represents the average success. The subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) clearly does not provide the highest profit. When considering the final performance, it seems that the autonomous agents achieved a very similar score to that of the group of subjects from their own culture, both as Player A and Player B. However, performance is by no means a scale for measuring behavior.
A composer of a culture dependent expert agent for the Trust-Revenge variants (for Player A), who's only interest is performance, should follow these guidelines:
1. Obviously, if the only interest is performance-one should never take revenge; 2. Similarly, in the dictator setting-one should not transfer any chips; 3. In the investment setting one should not trust, unless Player B is from the USA (which yields an average gain of 60 %); 4. In the TR 1 setting, one should trust only human players from the USA and India-this yield an average gain of 75 % for players from the USA and 10 % for players from India; 5. In settings TR 2 and TR 3, one should trust all 4 groups, producing a 94 % average gain;
We conclude this section by answering another interesting question, of whether (and to what extent) the actual activity of building autonomous agents influences human behavior. After the students in the Agents group composed their autonomous agents, they were asked to play the game themselves (the students were not aware that they would need to play the game, when they composed the agents, and we did not publish the performance of their agents until the students played the game themselves). In this experiment, the motivation was also based on bonus points and was identical to the motivation of the subjects in the Israeli group. We call this group of players the Composers. Figure 9 compares the average number of chips transferred (or paid) for settings (TR 1, TR 2 and TR 3) by players in the Israeli group to that of the Composers. We also added the Agents group for reference. The black bars show the confidence range (α = 0.05). As depicted in the figure, there is no statistical significance in the behavior of the players in the two human groups. Furthermore, the behavior of the subjects among the Composers does not seem by any means to be closer to that of their own agents than the subjects in the Israeli group. However, when examining the revenge in the investment and dictator settings ( which is attributed to human error for these settings), the Composers did indeed take revenge on average 62 % less than the Israeli group but still 70 % more than their own agents. However, since the human error is small in the first place, these results do not reach statistical significance, though they are very close ( p = 0.08). Note that a similar achievement of reducing human error could possibly be obtained also by different means (such as training). Therefore, it seems that the only impact that building agents had on the Composers was the reduction of human error.
This result seems to challenge the work by Elmalech et al. [46] which shows that composing autonomous agents does have impact on the composers' behavior. However, unlike our work, Elmalech et al. examined a single player game, which was not designed to capture any emotion. Any deviation from the optimal strategy may be assigned to human error. Therefore, Elmalech et al.'s results, that show how composing autonomous agents has impact on composers' behavior, may be limited to the impact on human error, which aligns with our own findings.
Discussion
This paper exhibits four findings using the trust-revenge game, the first, which is the main focus of this paper is that expert agents that interact with NGTE agents can use the same models developed for modeling cultural diversities within humans, for modeling the NGTE agents; second, the NGTE agents' behavior is closer to that of the subgame-perfect equilibrium; third NGTE agents are less prone to error; and finally, composing agents has no impact on human behavior aside of possibly reducing error rate. The trust-revenge game encompasses many of human prototype behavior, such as reciprocation and revenge. Emotions such as trust, fear, kindness, anger, envy and pity, also take a role in this game. Being a two player game (as opposed to a single player game) the trust-revenge game is a good platform to test human and NGTE behavior. To establish our work, different types of games should be studied, possibly including games which capture behavior such as anticipation, surprise and dishonesty. In our work we ensured that every group of human culture would only play with humans from its own culture, and that the group of agents would only play with agents. This was done, to enable all player to reason about the behavior of the second player and not require the players to be aware of possible culture diversity. More research is required in order to determine human and agent behavior in inter-cultural interaction along with interactions which include more than two players (in which some may be agents while others may be human possibly from different cultures). We did not explore whether there are hidden motivations for the subjects behaviors. Such behaviors might include the students being careful not to harm one another. This type of behavior could be evident even though the subject identity was hidden from the players, as they knew they were playing against other students, and might feel compelled to "be nice". On the other hand they may have been strongly competitive because of this. The subjects recruited through Mechanical Turk may have had similar compulsions, since they were explicitly told that they will be playing with subjects from their own culture. Further study of these issues remains for future work.
In this work, all autonomous agents were developed by participants having the same culture or cultural background (Israeli students). Our results post evidence for our general claim that NGTE agents behavior falls within the diversity of different human cultures, allowing expert agent developers to use methods currently used to model human cultures also with NGTE agents. However, to strengthen our claim, it would be interesting if our experiment could be repeated using a different agent developer culture. Our results could also benefit from being replicated with different human cultures and using different games.
Although having milder impact on expert agent designers, an interesting topic for future work would be to analyze how different might the behavior of NGTE agents developed by humans from a different culture, such as USA or India, be from the behavior presented by the Israeli students' agents. Having both USA and Indian students develop agents for the trust revenge game would allow us to determine the similarity among the three different groups of agents. Performing between subject analysis with both agents and humans from different cultures, will allow us to determine whether the behavior of NGTE agents from different cultures is more similar to one another or to the culture of the developer which composed them.
Conclusion and future work
Since autonomous agents are known to benefit from modeling their opponents we investigated how similar agents developed by NGTE are to humans. We evaluated autonomous agent behavior in the Trust-Revenge game, using 5 different variants of the game, and compared it to the behavior of people from three different cultures. We found that, like humans, the NGTE agents do not follow the subgame-perfect equilibrium when playing the game. The agents' behavior did not deviate from the standard behavior of the different cultures, and, in each of the stages of the game, the average action performed by the NGTE agents was within one standard deviation of the average action of the three human cultures. We deduce that when playing against agents developed by NGTE it is reasonable to assume that agents can be considered as an additional human culture and thus, expert agents that interact with humans from different cultures may use the same methods to interact with NGTE agents.
The revenge stage of the game is particularly interesting, as there is clearly no motivation to take revenge. Taking revenge seems to be attributed to emotional human behavior or the search for justice, therefore, finding it embedded in the agents may seem unexpected. We found that even in the revenge stage the agents behave in a similar fashion to the humans, and differences in the revenge extent between the agents and the humans are not larger than the differences found between various cultures. The only exception we found to this rule was that the agents are less prone to error, and thus scarcely took revenge when the revenge rate was 0.
When building an expert agent intended for interaction with autonomous agents composed by NGTE, it is important to know whether we need to develop new models to describe the NGTE. Our findings indicate that these autonomous agents should use the same models developed for interaction with humans from various cultures. For example if one wants to design an expert agent that is intended to play Poker on the Internet, it is fair to assume that this agent will play against autonomous agents designed by NGTE as well as human players from different cultures. It is very likely that the agents will exhibit attributes that humans use when playing, such as over-bluffing. Our study implies that these agents can be treated in the same manner as the various human cultures are treated. The same holds for electronic commerce, where autonomous agents are likely to be influenced by anchoring or the "sunk cost" effect. An expert agent which interacts with such NGTE agents, may exploit such behavior, just as an expert agent exploits such behavior in humans. For example, Hajaj et al. [49] present a comparison shopping agent in the domain of electronic commerce which interacts with humans and exploit human behavior such as the anchoring effect in order to encourage the humans not to query a different comparison shopping agent. However, whether using the exact same method used for a certain population (or culture) will be beneficial for an agent interacting with NGTE agents may depend on how well this agent may be extended to interacting with other cultures. That is, according to our results, if the agent can be extended to efficiently interact with other human cultures, it is very likely to be able to interact with NGTE agents using this same extension. If the agent has a model which can be trained on new data, such an extension may be achieved simply by retraining the same model used by the agent but on NGTE agents (rather than humans). Note, that this is not trivial since the human model usually relies on human behavior (known from psychology and social science) [24] and simply retraining the model is likely to fail if used, for instance, when interacting with a perfectly rational agent. Clearly, an agent which is already embedded with a capability of interacting with humans from different cultures, would be able to efficiently interact with NGTE agents and would require no additional changes.
We focused on agents developed by NGTE. However, it is known that agents designed by experts behave more rationally than agents developed by NGTE, and that humans who acquire vast experience in a game become more rational players [50, 51] . This encourages further study to examine whether treating NGTE agents as a culture may be extended to expert agents as well.
